In his paper, Famine, Affluence, and Morality (1972) Peter Singer advocates for the radical restructuring of our moral framework concerning global suffering. He first characterizes global suffering as a lack of food, money, and resources. Directing to the East Bengal natural disaster, Singer notes that the suffering of millions was preventable had affluent countries come to their aid. His rationale rests on two points. Firstly, he argues that we should help people in need if we have the capability. In this regard, Peter argues that we have the necessary resources to help people in need. Compared to decades ago, people and countries have a surplus of resources that they can use to help vulnerable communities. In his own words: “It is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce and further suffering.” Singer implies that a lack of resources is not holding us back from helping these people.

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Secondly, Peter explains how by helping these people, we are not sacrificing anything of comparable moral worth. He classifies the term, “without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance”, into three categories. First, what one compromises should not lead to any unintended consequences. For example, if one donates money to children  in poverty, but afterward, he is broke, it would contravene the criteria. The second criteria is that the compromise should not cause harm. For example, if one donates with stolen money, it would be immoral. Thirdly, the good is smaller in magnitude than the bad; the amount of money one donates should be commensurate with the help people receive. Based on these categories, we can easily see that by donating and helping out, most of us aren’t sacrificing anything. Most people don’t fit into these categories, which implies that these people have the obligation to donate. Peter also gives an example of a drowning boy. He explains how getting your clothes muddy in the process of saving a life is better than having clean clothes and condoning a death. Peter also argues that donating “is not charitable or generous.” By this, he implies that donating and assisting those in duress are duties, not something someone does out of the kindness of their heart. Hence, Peter argues that assisting others when one has the capacity is not ‘supererogatory’; it is a moral duty.